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Abstract 
 
An  influential  body  of  literature  in  macro-management  research  (notably,  organization  theory  and  strategic 
management) associates pro-social motivation solely with firm-like organizations, suggesting that such motivation 
cannot thrive under more market-like arrangements. We question this argument on theoretical, as well as empirical, 
grounds. As to the latter, we discuss the specific case of a network of firms in Brazil, the Genolyptus network. 
We  argue  that  this  particular  network  manifests  strong  pro-social  motivations.  This  implies  that  pro-social 
motivations may thrive beyond corporate boundaries, contradicting the above argument. More constructively, the 
case of the Genolyptus network points to the importance of intensive communication, rewards that are tied to joint 
outcomes, knowledge-based authority and consensual decision-making as support arrangements that can build and 
sustain pro-social motivations in non-firm governance structures.  
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Introduction 
 
 
In this paper, we examine the motivational foundations of economic organization, specifically the 
extent to which the motivations of members differ across governance structures (markets, hybrids, 
hierarchies; Williamson, 1996). This research question is prompted by a recent influential stream in 
macro-management theory (in particular, organization theory and strategic management) that casts the 
main difference between organizations, such as firms, and other kinds of economic organization — 
notably markets — in motivational terms (e.g., Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1996). 
The basic argument is that motivations differ in kind across different governance structures. Thus, the 
argument is different from the well-known organizational economics argument that organizations, such 
as firms, and markets differ in terms of the strength or intensity of their incentives (e.g., Williamson, 
1996). Specifically, the argument is that firms can build pro-social motivation among employees, and 
that  non-firm  economic  organizations  (i.e.,  markets and  hybrid)  cannot.  In  fact,  the  latter  may  be 
destructive of such motivation. Pro-social motivation is generally understood to be the motivation to 
engage in behaviors that benefit others, such as helping, sharing, and donating. The motivation to engage 
in such behaviors ranges all the way from pure altruism over to more reciprocal motivations to self-
interest (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002).  
The literature on pro-social motivation spans several research streams in social psychology (e.g., 
Grant & Dutton, 2012), behavioral economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Isaac, Mathieu, & Zajac, 
1991), and moral philosophy (e.g., Sandel, 2013). In management research, pro-social motivation is 
invoked in parts of organizational behavior literature (e.g., LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002), in writings 
on corporate social responsibility (e.g., Servaes & Tamayo, 2013), and in organizational theory. In the 
context of organizational theory, Osterloh and Frey (2000) argue that firms can govern transactions, 
particularly those relating to the sharing and building of valuable knowledge, in subtle ways that are 
compromised by the high-powered incentives of the marketplace but make use of the specific pro-social 
motivation of firms. Lindenberg and Foss (2011) proffer the notion of joint production motivation as 
a specific kind of pro-motivation that can be called forth by firms. They uniquely associate this kind of 
motivation with firm-like organizations.  
Even within transaction cost economics, Williamson (1996) suggests that a particular feature of 
firms is their access to low-powered incentives, which facilitates certain types of transactions. Several 
other contributions, many published in top management research journals, echo or express similar ideas 
in various ways (e.g., Adler, 2001; Ferraro et al., 2005; Foss & Lindenberg, 2012; Ghoshal, 2005; 
Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Spender, 1996). Further argument asserts that the ability of firms to cultivate pro-social motivation 
underlie organizational advantage (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998); that is, firm-like organizations can 
carry out activities that other kinds of economic organizations are incapable of carrying out (at the same 
level). Chief among these advantages is knowledge sharing (Osterloh & Frey, 2000) and knowledge 
integration (Kogut & Zander, 1992). In fact, many of the above contributions belong to what is often 
called the knowledge-based view of the firm (e.g., Spender, 1996). The clear implication of these 
contributions is that markets and other non-firm governance structures should be used sparingly for the 
organization of knowledge processes such as innovation, knowledge sharing, knowledge integration, 
and so on (Kogut & Zander, 1992).  
In this study, we question these ideas, in particular the tight linking of pro-social motivation and 
governance structure. Specifically, based on 42 semi-structured interviews, we study a single illustrative 
case, namely the case of a Brazilian inter-firm network, called the Genolyptus Network, that was 
dedicated to joint innovative projects and partly orchestrated by public organizations. Building on this 
case, and on theoretical arguments, we suggest that strong pro-social motivation can in fact thrive within 
non-firm economic organizations, notably in networks. Evolutionary anthropology suggests that humans 
have been hardwired by evolution to mobilize a specific motivation for cooperating in team-like settings, 
characterized by a high degree of interdependence and the need for ongoing mutual adjustments.  Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   367 
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However,  while  many  productive  activities  that  take  place  in  firms  do  indeed  have  these 
characteristics,  so  do  many  productive  activities  that  cut across  firm  boundaries,  such  as  supplier 
relations and network relations between cooperating firms. It may be that what looks like pro-social 
motivation in such relations (and perhaps even within firms) is in fact entirely selfish in motivation, 
albeit checked by reputation effects, hostages, and so on (cf. Klein & Leffler, 1981). Yet, we argue that 
our case speaks against such an interpretation, and instead in favor of the idea that pro-social motivations 
can thrive beyond firm boundaries. This requires that individuals who engage in non-firm economic 
organizations be capable of building support structures that can preserve pro-social motivations. Our 
case suggests that this is in fact possible, and we discuss the nature of such structures in general.  
In sum, we contribute to the recent discussion in macro-management theory about the nature of 
organizations in general and firms in particular, a discussion that has strongly influenced management 
research  fields  such  as  organization,  strategic  management  and  international  business  theory.  We 
specifically argue that pro-social motivations not only exist, but also thrive outside of the boundaries of 
the firm, for example, in firm networks, and as such are not unique to firms. In fact, the mechanisms 
that support pro-social motivations in firms — namely, intensive communication, rewards that are tied 
to  joint  outcomes,  knowledge-based  authority,  and  consensual  decision-making  —  are  also  the 
mechanisms that support pro-social  motivations in non-firm governance structures. Given this, we 
propose a research program dedicated to  examining the relative  advantages of firms and  non-firm 
economic organizations fostering pro-social motivation and the mechanisms these different governance 
structures deploy to foster such motivation.  
 
 
Theoretical  Background:  Pro-Social  Motivation,  Organizations,  and  the  Knowledge-
Based View 
 
 
Pro-social motivation: meaning 
 
Many streams in management research highlight the pro-social motivation that may thrive in 
firms. Work on the knowledge-based view of the firm in strategic management, organization theory and 
other macro-management research fields stress that efficient knowledge production, integration, sharing 
and so on require high levels of pro-social motivation, that is, the motivation to engage in behaviors that 
benefit others, such as helping, sharing, and donating. Standard examples of pro-social behavior include 
donating  blood,  whistle-blowing,  giving  money  to  charities,  and  general  helpful  behavior.  Such 
behaviors fundamentally matter to the smooth working of organizations. Helpful employees are an 
obvious resource that make processes run smoothly because helping others aids in reducing bottlenecks, 
solving  problems  and  evening  out  workflows.  In  the  context  of  knowledge  creation,  sharing  and 
integration, these knowledge-related activities are inherently hard to measure and incentivize, and thrive 
best with weak incentives and less-controlling environments (e.g., Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Research 
has  found  that  pro-social  behaviors  stimulate  sales  performance  (Podsakoff  &  MacKenzie,  1994), 
operating efficiency (Walz & Niehoff, 2000), product quality (Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 
1997), as  well  as  coordination,  innovation,  organizational  development,  and  cohesion  (see  Organ, 
Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006).  
An additional argument asserts that firms are better capable of building support structures for such 
motivation  and  that  markets  are  destructive  of  it  (e.g.,  Adler,  2001;  Ferraro  et  al.,  2005; Foss  & 
Lindenberg, 2012; Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 
1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Spender, 1996). The underlying argument is that firms can decouple 
efforts  and  rewards  in  a  way  that  markets  cannot,  better  build  shared  knowledge  across  multiple 
interacting  individuals,  and  cultivate  a  sense  of  shared  purpose.  Such  features  strongly  support 
knowledge creation, sharing and integration.  
Pro-social motivation is also influential in micro-management research. For example, influential 
research on organizational citizenship (Deckop, Mangel, & Cirka, 1999; LePine et al., 2002; Podsakoff N. Foss, R. Milagres  368 
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& MacKenzie, 1997) points to other-oriented motivation (e.g., helping, sportsmanship, civil virtue). 
Work on identities in relations (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Brickson, 2005, 2007) emphasizes that mutual 
concern for the interest and outcomes of significant others may be quite salient to employees. In the 
field of organizational or collective identification (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 
2000) research emphasizes employees’ membership in a collective category, and indicate that belonging 
to such categories imply that they adopt similar motivations. Some research explicitly link collective 
goals  to  the  motivation  of  organizational  members.  Shamir  (1990,  1991)  coined  the  notion  of 
collectivistic work motivation, recognizing that organizational members can be motivated in terms of 
what is beneficial to the organization (or a sub-group within the organization). Literature on teams (e.g., 
Kozlowski  &  Ilgen,  2006;  Mathieu,  Maynard,  Rapp,  &  Gilson,  2008)  also  addresses  the  special 
motivation that may be attached to teamwork (i.e., the team spirit phenomenon). Various written works 
beyond management research also address pro-social motivation, notably social psychology (e.g., Grant 
& Dutton, 2012), behavioral economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Isaac et al., 1991), and moral 
philosophy (e.g., Sandel, 2013).  
 
Pro-social motivation as a distinguishing characteristic of firm organizations 
 
In  spite  of  considerable  attention  to  pro-social  motivation,  some  key  issues  have  not  been 
sufficiently investigated, and because of this, assumptions that have not been sufficiently examined 
dominate some key literatures in management research that make use of the pro-social motivation 
construct, notably the streams of research in organization theory and strategic management theory that 
cluster around the knowledge-based view of the firm.  
An  important  question  concerns  the  institutional  locus  of  pro-social  motivation,  specifically 
whether such motivation can exist beyond the boundaries of organizations. A number of contributions 
to the theory of the firm in management research, in particular the knowledge-based view, address this 
issue (e.g., Adler, 2001; Ferraro et al., 2005; Foss & Lindenberg, 2011, 2012; Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal 
& Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Osterloh & 
Frey, 2000; Spender, 1996).  
The argument that pro-social motivation is uniquely associated with firms takes several forms. 
Closest to traditional organizational economics (e.g., Williamson, 1996), Osterloh and Frey (2000) argue 
that many vital activities, particularly those involving pro-social behaviors (knowledge sharing, helping 
behaviors) in firms are characterized by a very high measurement in costs. As a result it is very difficult 
(costly) to define clear measures and measure input and output performance against such data. In fact, 
attempts to encourage pro-social behaviors in this way may backfire, as explicit performance control 
can crowd out pro-social and intrinsic motivations, thus reducing the supply of pro-social behaviors (as 
well as behaviors that thrive on intrinsic motivation, such as creativity and learning). Therefore, firms 
should cultivate pro-social motivations and refrain from using high-powered performance incentives, 
particularly when pro-social and/or creative behaviors are involved.  
A related argument is that “shared purpose transforms the institutional context in which relations 
are embedded and, thereby, influences the behaviours and preferences of actors” (Ghoshal & Moran, 
1996, p. 33). Such shared purpose leverages the “human ability to take initiative, to cooperate, and to 
learn; it also may rely on exploiting the organization’s internalized purpose and diversity to enhance 
both learning and its use in creating innovations and purposive adaptation” (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, p. 
42). Shared purpose has thus direct motivational connotations; indeed, the shared part directly speaks 
to pro-social motivations (cf. also Shamir, 1990, 1991). A further argument states that firms  
provide  the  normative  territory  to  which  members  identify.  This  identification  has  two 
implications. First, it defines the conventions and rules by which individuals coordinate their 
behaviour and decision making … Second, identification sets out the process by which learning 
is developed socially through the formation of values and convergent expectations (Kogut & 
Zander, 1996, p. 506).  Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   369 
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These specific virtues of firms are explicitly contrasted with the market. To Ghoshal and Moran 
(1996),  introducing  high-powered  incentives  reminiscent  of  market  organization  means  implicitly 
treating employees as potential opportunists, which may set in motion destructive processes of a self-
fulfilling prophecy (see also Ferraro et al., 2005; Ghoshal, 2005). To Hodgson (1998) and Adler (2001) 
such incentives destroy internal trusting relationships. To Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and Kogut and 
Zander (1996), bringing market-like mechanisms into the firm is destructive of the sense of shared 
purpose and the attendant pro-social motivations. Kogut and Zander (1996, p. 511) summarize this in 
the following manner:  
In  the  market  model,  communication  consists  of  the  coding  and  decoding  of  information, 
coordination proceeds through transactions governed by prices, and learning is the revelation of 
cooperative  or dishonest reputations. In the view of a firm as embodying social knowledge, 
coordination is achieved through convergent expectations, communication is characterized by 
discourse based on rich codes and classifications, and learning is situated. 
Ultimately, these organizational advantages are possible because firms can cultivate pro-social 
motivations, and markets cannot.  
 
The micro-foundations of the argument 
 
The micro-foundations of the above argument that only firms can build pro-social motivations 
are seldom spelled out in great detail (in fact, to some extent, we have provided interpretations of what 
the authors cited above  may  mean). However,  we suggest that  the relevant  micro-foundations are 
roughly the following. Firms have a fundamentally team-like dimension (Foss & Lindenberg, 2012); 
thus, they are characterized by strong interdependencies in inputs, and by inputs that are difficult to 
measure (cf. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Moreover, they rely on ongoing mutual 
adaptation.  Such  adaptation  is  supported  by  shared  values  and  beliefs  and  pro-social  motivations 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
These pro-social motivations provide the basis for pro-social behaviors, that is, actions that are 
intended to help or benefit the individual, the group, or organization toward which they are directed, are 
discretionary, and therefore, not recognized by formal evaluation systems (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). As 
such, pro-social behaviors are essential to the smooth and intelligent adaptation of firms to changing 
contingencies. They cannot be called forth by extrinsic motivators, such as promotion, direct orders, or 
performance-contingent monetary rewards (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Penner, Dovidion, Piliavin, & 
Schroeder, 2005; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). Trying to deploy extrinsic motivators to stimulate pro-social 
behaviors may, in fact, be counter-productive, because such motivators risk crowding out pro-social 
motivations and their resulting behaviors. And yet, pro-social behaviors may be very important to the 
effective functioning of the organization (Osterloh & Frey, 2000), as demonstrated by such examples of 
typical  pro-social  behaviors  like  helping  colleagues,  showing  loyalty  to  the  organization,  sharing 
knowledge, exercising civic virtue, and actively engaging in self-development. 
In sum, a number of streams in management research make the case that firms can mobilize 
particular pro-social motivations. Many scholars make the additional, and stronger, case that only firms 
can mobilize these motivations, and some make the even stronger claim that firms are institutions that 
are  specialized  in  calling  forth  these  motivations  (e.g.,  Hodgson,  1998;  Kogut  &  Zander,  1996). 
However, a number of things are left unclear in these analyses, notably what the antecedents of pro-
social motivations are and whether firms are the only governance structures or institutions that can play 
the role of support structures sustaining pro-social motivations. In this sense, the micro-foundations of 
the argument that governance structures and pro-social motivations are connected in a systematic way 
are incomplete. To add to those  micro-foundations, we  need to be  more specific about pro-social 
motivation and its background.  
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Pro-social motivations: goal framing and supporting structures 
 
From the point of basic economics, pro-social motivation represents a puzzle. It may not be 
associated with reciprocity and self-interest. Moreover, economics holds that there is a propensity to 
shirk duty in cooperative ventures, whether concerning teams (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) or the supply 
of public goods. Firms clearly have team-features and many firm-specific assets are like public goods 
in the sense that they everyone in the firm benefits from them and this does not diminish their supply. 
Firm-specific capabilities, brands, reputations and so on, are examples. Reviewing the evidence on 
experimental game-theoretic studies of cooperation (in terms of public good provision), Ledyard (1995, 
p. 172) concluded that “it is possible to provide an environment in which almost all of the subjects 
contribute toward the group interest.… Why … this all works remains a mystery”. Apparently, situations 
exist that somehow prime individuals to adopt group goals and let their behaviors be influenced by such 
goals.  The  contributions  that  we  have  surveyed,  above  all,  essentially  argue  that  only  firms  can 
accomplish this priming.  
Based on arguments from  evolutionary anthropology, experimental economics and cognitive 
sociology, Lindenberg and Foss (2011) provide a distinct perspective on such priming. They argue that 
humans  are  equipped  with  capacity  for  recognizing  a  situation  as  one  of,  what  they  call,  joint 
production (i.e., team production) and to trigger the special motivational and cognitive faculties to 
participate in joint production (cf. Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; see also Foss & Lindenberg, 
2012). These authors argue that management of these pro-social motivations — what they call joint 
production motivation — is primarily a matter of the management of cognitions. They build this 
argument from goal-framing theory, which applies the insight from (social) cognition research that 
mental  constructs  have  to  be  activated  in  order  to  affect  behavior,  and  that  goals  are  particularly 
important  mental  constructs  in  which  cognitions  and  motivations  are  intertwined  (e.g.,  Förster, 
Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009; Lindenberg, 2008).  
Goals govern what individuals attend to (Posner & Petersen, 1990); what concepts and what kinds 
of knowledge are being activated; what alternatives we consider; what information we are primarily 
sensitive  to;  what  we  expect  others  to  do, and  how  we  process  information  (Förster  et al.,  2005; 
Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009). These processes have a direct influence on 
motivation,  because  with  one  goal  being  focal,  that  means  that  other  goals  are  pushed  into  the 
background (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002), and because goals are associated with different sets 
of preferences and criteria for evaluating courses of action vis-à-vis meeting goals. Lindenberg and Foss 
(2011) argue that there is one overarching goal which is connected to a pro-social, supra-individual 
orientation. They call this the normative goal. It concerns what is appropriate behavior in the context 
of furthering a collective entity, whether a group, organization, or nation (Moorman & Blakely, 1995; 
Van Knippenberg, 2000).The criteria for goal fulfillment are linked to the realization of joint goals and 
to  meeting  joint  appropriateness  standards.  When  the  normative  goal  is  focal,  the  two  competing 
individual-interest goals are pushed into the cognitive background, which suspends opportunism. 
Lindenberg and Foss (2011) discuss a number of management and organizational practices that 
can initiate and maintain joint production motivation. The first group deals with the preconditions for 
activating a normative goal frame that is conducive to joint production motivation — namely, the fact 
that members of an organization perceive their interdependence in terms of joint production (through 
team and task structure). They include linking task and team structures in a transparent manner to 
common goals. The second group deals with direct supports for the normative goal frame and mainly 
encompass cognitive/symbolic management. The third group includes the more indirect supports for the 
normative goal frame through calibrating reward structures, so that they are explicitly geared towards 
joint goals.  
 
   Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   371 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 364-384, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Pro-social motivation beyond firms?  
 
As noted, many influential management scholars argue that pro-social motivations in the context 
of productive activities are the exclusive province of firms. To provide an anchor for the discussion and 
examine the reach of this argument, consider the notions of joint production and the attendant joint 
production motivation (a kind of pro-social motivation triggered by joint production situations) coined 
by  Lindenberg  and  Foss  (2011).  Joint  production  refers  to  any  productive  activity  that  involves 
heterogeneous  but  complementary  resources  and  a  high  degree  of  task  interdependence.  Their 
conception  implies  that  human  beings  are  especially  equipped  with  coordinated  cognitive  and 
motivational faculties that are geared to participating in joint production. Individuals who engage in 
joint production perceive the environment differently than they do in independent action.  
Specifically, as Lindenberg and Foss (2011) explain, individuals engaged in joint production 
recognize a joint endeavor and see themselves as part of this endeavor, each with his or her own roles 
and  responsibilities,  involving  a  sharing  of  cognitions  about  the  relevant  tasks,  interdependencies, 
timing, and possible obstacles  in smoothing coordination in terms of joint goals. They are able to 
mutually anticipate goal-related actions from others and to cognitively coordinate temporal and special 
aspects of cooperation (Higgins & Pittman, 2008; Sebanz  et al., 2006). They  exert intelligent and 
adaptive efforts — that is, they engage in problem-solving and helping efforts that result in productivity 
gains and innovativeness. They are willing to supply inducement and assistance to others to make them 
do their bit (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), and to sanction them if they do not 
(Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). In ambiguous situations, group members will search for ways to 
serve the group goal(s), rather than waiting to be instructed (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Knippenberg, 2008; 
Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001), and they are heedful of their and others’ contribution to collective goals 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
It is not immediately obvious why joint production can’t take place outside firm boundaries, nor 
why the required joint production motivation cannot thrive in, for example, a network of firms. Indeed, 
as  Frey, Luethi and Osterloh (2011) show, community enterprises, such as open-source software 
production and Wikipedia, are not firms; yet, they are built, at least to some extent, on pro-social 
motivations (more ego-centric motivations may be relevant to the extent that, e.g., contributing to the 
community enterprise furthers one’s career). It may be countered that the crucial difference between 
open-source networks and firms is that, as to the latter, there is a fixed membership, whereas to the 
former, members self-select themselves in and out. This means that for open-source networks, problems 
of overstretching team size does not occur. Moreover, community enterprises often function exactly 
because productive activities are highly modular, as in markets. In contrast, firms may arise when 
productive activities require close coordination, often involving co-specialization and asset specificity 
problems (Williamson, 1996). However, the point here is that, perhaps strongly, pro-social motivation 
is possible in the context of non-firm commercial transactions. In order to understand whether joint 
production and the motivation for it (and, more broadly, pro-social motivations) may thrive beyond the 
boundaries of the firm, and what this requires, we discuss a specific fixed-membership network.  
 
 
Pro-Social Motivation in a Network: The Genolyptus Case 
 
 
Method: data and analysis      
 
We adopt a small (one-N) research design in our examination of pro-social  motivation in a 
network. Such designs are sometimes seen as slightly suspect, because of external validity problems 
deriving from sample bias (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). However, our basic purpose is to document 
the existence of strong pro-social motivations in the context of joint production in a non-firm setting. 
Moreover, as Dyer and Wilkins (1991, p. 617) explain, if executed well, case studies can be “extremely 
powerful” when “authors have described general phenomenon so well that others have little difficulty N. Foss, R. Milagres  372 
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seeing  the  same  phenomenon  in  their  own  experience  and  research”.  In  other  words,  good  case 
descriptions may succeed in identifying generative mechanisms other researchers can recognize in the 
cases they investigate (Hedström, 2005). To do this, however, it is usually necessary to “provide a rich 
description of the social scene, to describe the context in which events occur, and to reveal … the deep 
structure of social behavior” (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991, p. 615).  
Accordingly, we report on the findings from a longitudinal field study conducted between 2004 
and 2008. The field study relied on participation of network representatives. In all, 42 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted (Appendix), with a total of 65 hours of transcriptions. In addition to this, a 
significant part of the collective memory of the network, as represented by more than 3,200 e-mails 
exchanged  between  the  members,  and  all  the  official  documentation  produced  were  analysed. 
Documents and information produced during the interviews were analyzed using the software N Vivo, 
which helped us organize the data. The techniques used were content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004) and 
the constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Establishing the categories of analysis was 
the result of a joint effort between the researchers involved. Specifically, one researcher proposed the 
categories of analysis and these categories were refined through further discussions and an ongoing 
dialogue with the case material. 
All these techniques enhanced our interpretation and allowed generating categories that integrate 
the theoretical framework and  explain the  observed  phenomenon (Langley, 1999). Based on these 
techniques, we developed a data structure which consisted of three groups, namely, data on the (a) 
contractual, (b) procedural governance and (c) industry contexts. These groups were then subdivided, 
part of them pre-selected according to the theoretical background and the other part from an inductive 
process. The latter introduced the theme of joint production motivation. Thus, documents and interviews 
conducted in the first and second phase greatly contributed to understanding team design, the goals 
pursued, and the tasks performed in the network. For example, in the second phase, an important point 
stressed in the interview with the Genolyptus’ coordinator was the interdependences within and across 
the individuals involved in different network projects. From the interviews performed during the third 
phase, documents about the context in which the Genolyptus was placed and e-mails, we collected 
evidence concerning symbolic management, reward structures, and authority design in the network. In 
sum,  these  techniques  enhanced  our  interpretation  and  allowed  the  production  of  categories  that 
integrated the theoretical framework and helped to explain the phenomena observed in the Genolyptus 
network.  
The empirical research effort was carried out in three stages. In the first stage, nine interviews 
were conducted and the  objective  was to obtain a generic understanding of how the  network was 
structured, the activities of its members and their objectives. The interviews lasted between 45 and 140 
minutes and were recorded and transcribed. Following the comparative method, over time the scripts of 
the interviews were adjusted (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This helped refining the analysis and adding 
categories to our theoretical perspective. In the second stage, access was granted to the complete set of 
documents that were produced during the history of the network (i.e., all emails, reports, minutes of 
meetings, evaluations, contracts and their annexes). Then, new interviews with the coordinator were 
conducted to confirm initial understanding and drawing up the final interview schedule. In the third 
stage, thirty-two interviews were held, lasting on average an hour and a half. 
 
The genolyptus network 
 
Brazil is highly competitive in the paper and pulp sector, thanks to its natural resources but also 
due to the development of modern silviculture technologies and growing R&D investments in the sector. 
Over the last few years Brazil has significantly increased research related to many native species. These 
efforts have increased the country’s productivity. However, in the early 2000s, there was a widespread 
perception that the growth of competitiveness required a more aggressive posture in terms of R&D 
investments. However, the individual companies lacked the technological and financial resources to 
maintain a sustained effort in terms of engaging in continuous innovation, building specific knowledge, 
investing in specialized equipment, and reducing uncertainty in terms of return on investment.  Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   373 
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The network was set up to serve these aims in February 2002. It was perceived as a major project 
in terms of its capacity to articulate recognized competencies in the industrial sector (i.e., 14 companies) 
and  in  research  institutions  (i.e.,  7  universities  and  Embrapa  -  Brazilian  Agricultural  Research 
Corporation, a governmental research institute). The network’s goals were to discover, validate and 
characterize the functions of the eucalyptus genes which are economically important production and 
forest development programs. To do so, the network aimed at ensuring that partners had access to 
methods and scientific information that could be implemented in their development programs.  
The network partners relied on the design of contracts and work plans undertaken during the 
network’s formation process. However, it also relied on a set of standards which emerged in a trial-and-
error process. The need to set up governance structures characterized the initial discussions held in the 
network. As a result, drawing-up the contract, in which the formal rules were established, took more 
than a year. The establishment of these rules provided a reference, guiding the work. However, as the 
network developed, formal rules gave way to a set of much more informal rules that went on to govern 
the network’s day-to-day operations. According to the interviewees, such informality could be ascribed 
to experience derived from previous partnerships and from personal and institutional relationships in the 
sector.  
The above characteristics justify the choice of the Genolyptus case as the basis for this research. 
In the beginning of its history the network was characterized as a pioneer project in Brazil, not only in 
terms of the breadth of its goals, but also in terms of its ability to combine and articulate skills in the 
relevant industries and research institutions around a national network. It is also worth mentioning that 
the network had records of all documents produced throughout its history and made them available for 
analysis in this study.  
Besides, the choice of Genolyptus as an illustrative case was due to the fact that when the network 
was investigated, we faced the same elements that compose the analysis on pro-social motivation in the 
organizational environment. So it represented an opportunity to investigate if the framework of how pro-
social motivation can be applied in a network environment. Therefore, we consider that its analysis will 
represent a breakthrough in literature, since no previous studies that discuss this concept in the context 
of networks exist. However, since this is a single case study it is suggested that further research need to 
be conducted to confirm this evidence or not. 
 
Coordinating sub-projects and tasks  
 
Although the network was launched in 2002, the idea had been launched in 2000, in a forum that 
brought together the sector’s leaders. A discussion on a preliminary design began and researchers from 
a few universities were invited to develop it. Once developed, it was sent to the companies, with a 
questionnaire to assess preliminary expectations. The product of this joint effort became the project’s 
initial rough-draft, which from then on, counted on the contributions of all involved. A number of factors 
during the network’s set-up and implementation phase contributed to creating a common understanding 
of the project and to stressing the interdependence of its sub-projects and the participating parties. The 
technical design promoted the convergence of interests, since it dealt with basic scientific research (the 
interest of the universities) and experimental improvements (the interest of the companies) that were 
highly complementary. As a manager in one of the partner companies stated; “People who are in the 
company have superior tacit knowledge. The staff of universities has another kind of knowledge, they 
study,  possess  theory,  have  time  to  think.  This  is  a  highly  complementary  relation”.  Similarly,  a 
professor from one of the participating universities stated that the knowledge that is being generated is 
very advanced and is extremely multidisciplinary ... it is something that only come into existence and is 
well used because it is done as a group ... it is the multidisciplinary nature and diversity of the people 
that makes the projects have more or less success. 
The  data strongly  suggests  that  the  capacity  to  motivate  participants  over  the  course  of  the 
network’s  creation  was  a  decisive  factor  for  its  success.  This  motivation  enabled  communication 
processes and training programs that ensured recurrent exchange of information among participants, in N. Foss, R. Milagres  374 
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turn facilitating ongoing coordination. In fact, the training programs were perceived as an important 
instrument for generating the understanding of goals, tasks and interdependencies that  precede the 
formation of joint production motivation. Throughout the network’s existence, participants used various 
communication mechanisms and were able to keep up to date with the evolution of work-packages. 
Many meetings were held to demonstrate project progress, share experience and so on.  
Conflict resolution. Decisions were based on a broad discussion process, where open debate of 
various perspectives was emphasized. The following, taken from a project participants’ email, is typical 
for how unanticipated contingencies were handled: “However, since there is no provision for it explicitly 
in the work plan ... I believe it is important to submit the appraisal of all and undertake a global action”. 
This consensual decision-making standard was crucially important for work development, keeping up 
with schedule, minimizing conflicts, increasing information symmetry and maintaining the alignment 
between the sub-projects and the network. In particular, the many e-mails that were exchanged between 
members of the network manifest a flexible, open and adaptive behavioral stance, even when non-trivial 
modifications  were  required,  implying  the  commitment  of  more  work-effort,  resources  and  time. 
Strikingly, arguments were always based on the best interest of the network and the achievement of its 
objectives, that is, on group rather than individual goals. As a manager of one of the participating 
companies summarized: “What was sought was always an attempt at consensus ... the coordinator was 
very clever in this regard... But people were not complacent with each other in order to accept opinions 
that they did not agree with, I think a team spirit was developed, where everyone had the opportunity to 
express their way of saying no.”  
Shared purpose. The Genolyptus network was formed by highly experienced researchers. Its 
objective and composition exposed the group to opportunities for growth and professional updating. 
Moreover,  the  knowledge  base  used  was  characterized  by  high  levels  of  cumulativeness,  which 
influenced the decision to join in and increased the level of dedication of all participants. The hopes of 
acquiring unique know-how, which would define the future advancement of a research field, prompted 
situations where everyone involved was willing to contribute to the execution of tasks. These behaviors 
were driven by a shared sense of purpose; in particular, network members entertained high expectations 
that the knowledge to be created in the network would become a source of new competitive advantages 
that would drive the sector.  
While the network members were clearly oriented towards the goals of the network as a whole, 
there  was a  significant  element  of  reciprocity:  Everyone  contributed  at  a  high  level  and  expected 
everyone else to do the same. This was partly prompted by a recognition that efforts were highly 
complementary; thus, successful knowledge development was only possible through the combination of 
individual skills and the competencies of the participating institutions. All of these factors contributed 
to the emergence of a feeling among the members that they were part of a sustainable elite group, which 
in turn encouraged participation and contributed to the project’s success. As one of the participating 
university professors stated: “When the project is done in two years I’m sure we’ll all be connected ... 
technically we get along very well. We complement each other, this is a business that will last ... until I 
retire”. 
Monitoring. In order to support and sustain such involvement, the network relied on a monitoring 
system. Evaluations were made using established targets and schedules, and via publication of the work 
progress  in  written  minutes.  Furthermore,  during  general  meetings  with  network  members,  the 
coordinator would present the specific conditions of each sub-project. A 0-to-10 rating system reflected 
the level of goal-achievement vis-à-vis what was expected in the work plan. In cases of disparities 
between what was expected and what was de facto achieved, the sub-project’s coordinator had to justify 
why the work had not been concluded and what was pending for its conclusion. In this way, they 
considered both quantitative and qualitative measures, since the justification made room for process 
evaluation. Given the history of organizational relationships and of individuals that characterized this 
industry, there were also informal evaluations through telephone calls and e-mails.  
Hierarchical Structure. The interview data establish that there was a consensus among the 
participants that the overall network coordinator’s abilities to deal with the network’s diversity and keep Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   375 
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the group spirit thriving were key elements that enabled the project to succeed. The coordinator had an 
excellent reputation as a highly competent technician and researcher, and a skilled project manager. He 
was responsible for the project’s initial concept and design. During the elaboration phase, he was in 
charge of the integration between future members and inviting companies to participate in the project. 
He headed the definition of the project’s chief guidelines (objectives, work plan etc.). Overall, however, 
his authority was fundamentally knowledge-based, that is, based on his reputation for excellence in 
several dimensions, rather than formal authority-of-the-office.  
Decision-making  processes.  The  formal  tasks  and  activity  patterns  were  spelled  out  in  the 
contract and contributed to a high degree of transparency. Yet, network management had to address the 
fact that participating companies and universities were in potential competition, definitely not a trivial 
management task. In addition, there were also renowned and recognised sector leaders and strong 
personal  and  professional  relationships  among  the  network  actors.  These  individuals  held  strong 
bargaining powers qua their positions. To address these challenges the coordinator adopted a standard 
of network coordination and decision-making based on consensus and equality among participants. 
There were no established hierarchies or priorities among them, and all votes had the same weight. 
Decisions were arrived at by means of extensive debates, followed by a voting session with simple 
majority voting determining the outcome: “An important point in this network is the coordination and 
its ability to manage attrition, but the decision making is collective, is the majority. So it may be that we 
will take all afternoon to make a decision because there are many people involved ... control is solely in 
the hand of the coordinator, his competence to do and everything, but decisions are made jointly” 
(interview with manager of a partner company). When issues were related to a specific competence, the 
adopted standard was to debate and to explicitly rely on the network specialists’ knowledge. In other 
words, decision-making authority tended to be exercised by means of majority decisions in the case of 
general issues, while knowledge-based authority was invoked in the case of specific issues.  
 
Discussion: pro-social motivation in the genolyptus network 
 
Research suggests that pro-social motivations may thrive under a framework defined by a sense 
of  shared  purpose  (Kogut  &  Zander,  1996),  trust  (Nahapiet  &  Ghoshal,  1998),  and  a  shared 
understanding of interdependencies (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011), that is, individuals share a perception 
of a joint production effort and are motivated to take part in it. As we have pointed out, a number of 
contributions to the knowledge-based view in organizational theory and strategic management suggest 
that only firms can successfully contribute these conditions. In contrast, we argue that the Genolyptus 
network was characterized by these exact conditions and as such was capable of creating pro-social 
motivations.  
 
Perceived joint production 
 
An  individual’s  motivation  for  joint  production  requires  a  clear  understanding  of  the  tasks 
performed individually and by the team, including a clear understanding of how the focal individual’s 
effort  is  connected  to  those  of  other  individuals  in  the  joint  production.  The  maintenance  of  this 
motivation requires a communication process that ensures both recurrent exchanges of information as 
well as conflict-resolution  mechanisms. Establishing the Genolyptus network was a process which 
contributed to the creation of these conditions, as we have detailed. In addition, the interview data 
suggest that the communication process in the network was crucially important for maintaining the sense 
of shared purpose and clarifying to all participants the exact nature of  the division of labor in the 
network. The many workshops, training courses, and technical visits of network members to each other 
played similar roles and also helped to build strong trust-based relations.  
 
Cognition and symbolic management 
 
Joint  production  motivation  requires  a  shared  sense  of  shared  purpose.  This  can  often  be 
established  through  rites,  rituals,  norms,  and  conventions.  Literature  highlights  the  importance  of N. Foss, R. Milagres  376 
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governance mechanisms in stabilizing this common direction and, hence, making room for cooperative 
work (Kogut & Zander, 1996). The case evidence shows that participants invested significant time 
discussing the contract and they made great effort to construct a set of tools and routines to guide the 
day-to-day activities. But is this sufficient to promote joint production motivation?  
In an analysis of cooperative arrangements, Lindenberg (2000, p. 20) warned against seeing “… 
governance instrument as ‘ideal’ without having analyzed the question of what interests need to be 
aligned and what signals are consensually taken as positive relational signals in a particular industry”. 
Lindenberg analyzed such relational signals in five distinct situations and concluded that deviations in 
any one of them indicated problems with the cooperative frame stability. He specifically argues that a 
well-constructed  governance structure must consider the social context  of the organization, how it 
contributes to the normative goal-frame and, consequently, to joint production motivation. Indeed, to a 
large  extent  the  Genolyptus  network  could  build  from  existing  trust  relations  within  the  relevant 
industries. As a company representative expressed, the basic network contract “was implemented within 
a foundation of trust that already existed in companies ... the spirit of cooperation is already very high.”  
Such pre-existing trust relations were highly conducive to the creation of network-specific values 
and codes which in turn helped to create and sustain joint production motivation: “There is an overall 
agreement, to be sure. This may not be directly reflected in the contract in terms of commitment, but 
there is set of values that animate this network, and this set is an instrument of pressure” (interview with 
manager of a partner company). 
 
Recognition-based rewards structure 
 
Lindenberg and Foss (2011) argued that rewards can support the normative goal frame when they 
are connected to joint outcomes. The Genolyptus case provides evidence of such contribution, since 
individual rewards not only reinforced the normative goal frame, but were made to depend on the overall 
outcome of the activities of the network. Thus, the data show that participants understood that their own 
personal  income,  status,  etc.  was  connected  to  the  interdependence  of  the  tasks  in  the  network. 
Consequently, individuals with greater skills to act collaborativelly as a group, with stronger technical 
and relational reputations, would probably distinguish themselves in the industry. Still, these incentives 
played out in a particular social context: “The forestry sector is slightly different ... competing firms 
form alliances around common goals and even allow their genetic material to be made available for the 
network ... In general there is a very great friendship between colleagues in the field. And you know that 
any interaction must have a certain affinity. And this already exists in some form. Genolyptus was a part 
of all this” (interview with a professor from a partner university).  
Thus, the industry, and in turn the network, created opportunities for aligning goals and, from a 
long-term perspective, brought the individual goal and, thus, the reward structure, close to the normative 
goal.  
 
Knowledge-based authority design  
 
When  trying  to  achieve  goals  through  joint  production,  authority  systems  should  not  be 
legitimized through hierarchy; rather, the group should be directed towards joint production by means 
of the exercise of authority that is perceived by participating individuals as capable of contributing with 
essential know-how and information that are needed  to achieve the joint goal. The interview  data 
supports the interpretation that the Genolyptus network’s coordinator possessed exactly this capacity to 
guide his team to joint production. Indeed, the data reflects a general perception among the network 
participants that he possessed superior judgement, since he was perceived as a competent technician and 
researcher, in addition to being a skilled project manager. “He is one of the leading exponents of 
genomics in Brazil, if not the main one. And the network has the advantage that he is a natural leader, 
and people respect him” (interview with coordinator company). Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   377 
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Furthermore, the coordinator’s characteristics were reinforced by the decision-making processes 
adopted.  Consensus  and  respect  for  each  member’s  specific  know-how  were  the  Genolyptus 
coordinator’s  twin  pillars.  This  way,  even  though  the  network  management  revolved  around  its 
coordinator, network leadership was like a moving target and was exercised according to the specificities 
of the activities to be carried out. In such a case, the coordinator focused on providing the necessary 
conditions for information symmetry, establishing an open debate and trying to reach a consensus. Thus, 
the possibility of conflicts was minimized.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Research question and key finding 
 
An influential stream of thinking on the role and function of firms in a market economy asserts 
that firms exist because they provide rewards and motivation geared to the sourcing, combination, 
creation and sharing of knowledge (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 
1996; Madhok, 1996), and that providing such rewards and motivation is beyond the capabilities of 
markets and other forms of non-firm economic organization. These contributions are seldom explicit or 
detailed about the motivational mechanisms operating in firms, providing them with their supposedly 
unique  capability  of  organizing  delicate  knowledge  processes.  Lindenberg  and  Foss  (2011)  which 
explicitly speaks to the issue of how pro-social motivation in firms can be initiated and maintained. 
However, on the face of it, the argument that only firms can truly supply the pro-social motivation that 
supports various knowledge-processes flies in the face of phenomena such as open-source software 
development, Wikipedia, etc. that are arguably at least partly based on voluntary pro-socially motivated 
efforts by legally independent individuals. This raises the question whether pro-social motivation can 
exist beyond the boundaries of firms, for example, in networks, and, if so, what supports such pro-social 
motivation?  
We have documented a case that, relative to these theoretical expectations, is clearly a deviant 
case: All of the management and organization practices which according to Lindenberg and Foss (2011), 
are necessary to initiate and maintain joint production motivation were in fact present in the Genolyptus 
network. And yet, the participants in that network remained legally independent entities; in fact, many 
of  the  participants  were  independent  business  firms  and  potential  competitor.  Specifically,  the 
mechanisms that support pro-social motivations in firms — namely, intensive communication, rewards 
that are tied to joint outcomes, knowledge-based authority, and consensual decision-making — are also 
the mechanisms that support pro-social motivations in the non-firm governance structure we examined.  
 
Future research 
 
Our finding may be seen as a partial confirmation of Grandori’s (1997, 2001) argument that 
governance structures are not fundamentally distinguished in terms of the governance instruments they 
deploy to influence behaviors: The same governance mechanisms that support pro-social motivation in 
firms can also be found in networks. Future research should deal with whether markets are also capable 
of mimicking such mechanisms. Experimental research in social psychology and behavioral economics 
(e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004) suggests that pro-social motivation 
in fact do exist in markets. The question is what sustains such motivation in markets? However, this 
research also suggests that pro-social  motivation is  in lower supply in  market than in  non-market 
contexts.  
Given this, we propose a research program dedicated to examining the relative advantages of 
firms and non-firm economic organizations with respect to fostering pro-social motivation and the 
mechanisms these different governance structures deploy to foster such motivation. Our case evidence 
suggests that pro-social motivations can exist in a network, and, in fact, thrive. However, we cannot N. Foss, R. Milagres  378 
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establish in any conclusive way whether these motivations would have thrived better or worse in, say, 
an integrated operation that included all of the participants in the network (i.e., a Genolyptus firm). 
Similarly, we cannot establish any differences in the intensity with which networks and firms deploy 
the instruments that  may support pro-social  motivations. It is conceivable that firms  may  have an 
advantage here, because of their easier access to mechanisms of dispute resolution and information 
sharing (Williamson, 1996). If that is the case, the knowledge-based argument that we started out from 
in this research is vindicated, albeit in a more precise form: Although pro-social motivations can exist 
beyond the boundaries of the firm, firms have an organizational advantage when it comes to building 
and sustaining such motivations.  
 
 
References 
 
 
Adler, P. S. (2001). Market, hierarchy and trust: the knowledge economy and the future of capitalism. 
Organization Science, 12(2), 215-234. doi: 10.1287/orsc.12.2.215.10117 
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and  economic organization. 
American Economic Review, 62(5), 772-795. doi: 10.2307/1815199 
Brewer,  M.  B.,  &  Gardner,  W.  (1996).  Who  is  this  “we”?  Levels  of  collective  identity  and  self 
representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 83-93. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.71.1.83 
Brickson,  S.  L.  (2005).  Organizational  identity  orientation:  forging  a  link  between  organizational 
identity and organizations’ relations with stakeholders. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(4), 
576-609. doi: 10.2189/asqu.50.4.576 
Brickson, S. L. (2007). Organizational identity orientation: the genesis of the role of the firm and distinct 
forms  of  social  value.  Academy  of  Management  Review,  32(3),  864-888.  doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2007.25275679 
Brief, A. P., & Motowidlo, S. J. (1986). Prosocial organizational behaviors. Academy of Management 
Review, 11(4), 710-725. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1986.4283909 
Deckop, J. R., Mangel, R., & Cirka, C. C. (1999). Getting  more than you pay for: organizational 
citizenship behavior and pay-for-performance plans. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4), 
420-428. doi: 10.2307/257012 
De Dreu, C. K. W., Nijstad, B. A., & Knippenberg, D. van (2008). Motivated information processing in 
group judgment and decision making. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12(1), 22-49. 
doi: 10.1177/1088868307304092 
Dyer, W. G., Jr., & Wilkins, A. L. (1991). Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better theory: 
a  rejoinder  to  Eisenhardt.  Academy  of  Management  Review,  16(3),  613-619.  doi: 
10.5465/AMR.1991.4279492 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why social preferences matter – the impact of non-selfish motives 
on  competition,  cooperation  and  incentives. The  Economic  Journal,  112(478),  C1-C33.  doi: 
10.1111/1468-0297.00027 
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2005). Economics language and assumptions: how theories can 
become  self-fulfilling.  Academy  of  Management  Review,  30(1),  8-24.  doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2005.15281412 
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Accessibility from active and fulfilled goals. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 41(3), 220-239. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.06.009 Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   379 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 364-384, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Foss, N. J., & Lindenberg, S. M. (2011). Managing joint production motivation: the role of goal framing 
and  governance  mechanisms.  Academy  of  Management  Review,  36(3),  500-525.  doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2011.61031808. 
Foss, N. J., & Lindenberg, S. (2012). Teams, team motivation, and the theory of the firm. Managerial 
and Decision Economics, 33(5/6), 369-383. doi: 10.1002/mde.2559 
Frey, B. S., Luethi, R., & Osterloh, M. (2011). Community enterprises: an institutional innovation 
[CESifo  Working  Paper  Series  N
o.  3428].  Retrieved  from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1831123 
Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. Academy of 
Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75-91. doi: 10.5465/AMLE.2005.16132558 
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of 
Management Review, 21(1), 13-47. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1996.9602161563 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1996). The psychology of action: linking cognition and 
motivation to behavior. New York: Guilford Press. 
Grandori,  A.  (1997).  An  organizational  assessment  of  interfirm  coordination  modes. Organization 
Studies, 18(6), 897-925. doi: 10.1177/017084069701800601 
Grandori, A. (2001). Neither hierarchy nor identity: knowledge-governance mechanisms and the theory 
of  the  firm.  Journal  of  Management  and  Governance,  5(3/4),  381-399.  doi: 
10.1023/A:1014055213456   
Grant, A., & Dutton, J. (2012). Beneficiary or benefactor: are people more prosocial when they reflect 
on  receiving  or  giving?  Psychological  Science,  23(9),  1033-1039.  doi: 
10.1177/0956797612439424 
Haslam,  S.  A.,  Powell,  C.,  &  Turner,  J.  C.  (2000).  Social  identity,  self-categorization,  and  work 
motivation: rethinking the contribution of the group to positive and sustainable organisational 
outcomes. Applied Psychology, 49(3), 319-339. doi: 10.1111/1464-0597.00018 
Hedström, P. (2005). Dissecting the social: on the principles of analytical sociology. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Higgins, E. T., & Pittman, T. S. (2008). Motives of the human animal: comprehending, managing, and 
sharing  inner  states.  Annual  Review  of  Psychology,  59,  361-385.  doi: 
10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093726 
Hodgson, G. M. (1998). Competence and contract in the theory of the firm.  Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 35(2), 179-201.  
Isaac, R. M., Mathieu, D., & Zajac, E. E. (1991). Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness. 
Constitutional Political Economy, 2(3), 329-370. doi: 10.1007/BF02393135 
King,  G.,  Keohane,  R.  O.,  &  Verba,  S.  (1994).  Designing  social  inquiry:  scientific  inference  in 
qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981). The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 615-641. doi: 10.2307/1833028  
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of 
technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383-397. doi: 10.1287/orsc.3.3.383 N. Foss, R. Milagres  380 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 364-384, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1996). What firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning. Organization 
Science, 7(5), 502-518. doi: 10.1287/orsc.7.5.502 
Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Ilgen, D. R. (2006). Enhancing the effectiveness of work groups and teams. 
Psychological  Science  in  the  Public  Interest,  7(3),  77-124.  doi:  10.1111/j.1529-
1006.2006.00030.x 
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Kruglanski, A. W., & Köpetz, C. (2009). What is so special (and non-special) about goals? A view from 
the cognitive perspective. In G. B. Moskowitz & H. Grant (Eds.), The psychology of goals (pp. 
27-55). New York: Guilford Press. 
Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management Review, 24(4), 
691-710. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1999.2553248 
Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth 
(Eds.),  The  handbook  of  experimental  economics  (pp.  111-194).  Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton 
University Press. 
LePine, J. A., Erez, A., & Johnson, D. E. (2002). The nature and dimensionality of organizational 
citizenship behavior: a critical review & meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(1), 52-
65. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.87.1.52 
Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., & Ross, L. (2004). The name of the game: predictive power of reputations 
versus situational labels in determining prisoner’s dilemma game moves. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1175-1185. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264004 
Lindenberg, S. (2000). It takes both trust and lack of mistrust: the workings of cooperation and relational 
signaling in contractual relationships. Journal of Management and Governance, 4(1-2), 11-33. 
doi: 10.1023/A:1009985720365 
Lindenberg,  S.  (2008).  Social  rationality,  semi-modularity  and  goal-framing:  what  is  it  all  about? 
Analyse & Kritik, 30(2), 669-687. 
Lindenberg, S., & Foss, N. J. (2011). Managing joint production motivation: the role of goal framing 
and  governance  mechanisms.  Academy  of  Management  Review,  36(3),  500-525.  doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2011.61031808. 
Madhok, A. (1996). The organization of economic activity: transaction costs, firm capabilities and the 
nature of governance. Organization Science, 7(5), 577-590. doi: 10.1287/orsc.7.5.577 
Mathieu, J. E., Maynard, T. M., Rapp, T., & Gilson, L. (2008). Team effectiveness 1997-2007: a review 
of recent advancements and a glimpse into the future. Journal of Management, 34(3), 410-476. 
doi: 10.1177/0149206308316061 
Moorman,  R.  H., &  Blakely,  G.  L.  (1995).  Individualism-collectivism  as  an  individual  difference 
predictor of organizational citizenship behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16(2), 127-
142. doi: 10.1002/job.4030160204 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998.) Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. 
Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242-266. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1998.533225 
Organ, D. W., Podsakoff, P. M., & MacKenzie, S. B. (2006). Organizational citizenship behavior: its 
nature, antecedents, and consequences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   381 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 364-384, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Osterloh,  M.,  &  Frey,  B.  S.  (2000).  Motivation,  knowledge  transfer,  and  organizational  forms. 
Organization Science, 11(5), 538-550. doi: 10.1287/orsc.11.5.538.15204 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is 
possible. American Political Science Review, 86(2), 404-417. doi: 10.2307/1964229 
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: multilevel 
perspectives.  Annual  Review  of  Psychology,  56,  365-392.  doi: 
10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070141 
Podsakoff, P. M., Ahearne, M., & MacKenzie, S. B. (1997). Organizational citizenship behavior and the 
quantity and quality of work group performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82(2), 262-270. 
doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.82.2.262 
Podsakoff, P. M., & MacKenzie, S. B. (1994). Organizational citizenship behaviors and sales unit 
effectiveness. Journal of Marketing Research, 31(3), 351-363. doi: 10.2307/3152222 
Podsakoff,  P.  M.,  &  MacKenzie,  S.  B.  (1997).  Impact  of  organizational  citizenship  behavior  on 
organizational performance: a review and suggestions for future research. Human Performance, 
10(2), 133-151. doi: 10.1207/s15327043hup1002_5 
Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 13, 25-42. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ne.13.030190.000325 
Sandel, M. J. (2013). Market reasoning as moral reasoning: why economists should re-engage with 
political  philosophy.  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives,  27(4),  121-140.  doi: 
10.1257/jep.27.4.121 
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: bodies and minds moving together. 
Trends in Cognitive Science, 10(2), 70-76. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.009 
Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2013). The impact of corporate social responsibility on firm value: the role 
of customer awareness. Management Science, 59(5), 1045-1061. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1630 
Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Forgetting all else: on the antecedents and 
consequences of goal shielding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1261-1280. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1261 
Shamir, B. (1990). Calculations, values, and identities: the sources of collectivistic work motivation. 
Human Relations, 43(4), 313-332. doi: 10.1177/001872679004300402 
Shamir, B. (1991). Meaning, self and motivation in organizations. Organization Studies, 12(3), 405-
424. doi: 10.1177/017084069101200304 
Spender,  J.  C.  (1996).  Making  knowledge  the  basis  of  a  dynamic  theory  of  the  firm.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 7(S2), 45-62. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250171106 
Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. M. (1990). Basic of qualitative research. Grounded theory procedures and 
techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing 
intentions: the origin of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(5), 675-735.  
Van Knippenberg, D. (2000). Work motivation and performance: a social identity perspective. Applied 
Psychology, 49(3), 357-371. doi: 10.1111/1464-0597.00020 N. Foss, R. Milagres  382 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 364-384, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Walz,  S.  M.,  &  Niehoff,  B.  P.  (2000).  Organizational  citizenship  behaviors:  their  relationship  to 
organizational effectiveness. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 24(3), 301-319. doi: 
10.1177/109634800002400301 
Weick, K. E., & Roberts, K. H. (1993). Collective mind in organizations: heedful interrelating on flight 
decks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(3), 357-381. doi: 10.2307/2393372  
Weinstein,  N.,  & Ryan,  R.  M.  (2010).  When  helping  helps:  autonomous  motivation  for  prosocial 
behavior and its influence on well-being for the helper and recipient. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 98(2), 222-244. doi: 10.1037/a0016984 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Wrzesniewski, A., & Dutton, J. E. (2001). Crafting a job: revisioning employees as active crafters of 
their work. Academy of Management Review, 26(2), 179-201. doi: 10.5465/AMR.2001.4378011 
   Pro-social Motivation Beyond Firm Boundaries   383 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 364-384, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
APPENDIX 
 
 
List of Interviewees 
First Phase - Interviewees 
Institution  Position 
A  1  Director of Institutional Relationships 
B  2 
Professor 
C 
3 
D 
E  4 
F  5  Forestry R&D Coordinator 
G  6  R&D Manager 
H  7  Professor 
I  8  Researcher 
Second Phase 
I  8  Researcher 
Third Phase 
J 
9 
Researcher  L 
I  8 
M  5  R&D Coordinator 
N 
6 
R&D Manager 
O  Researcher 
P  Project Coordinator 
Q  Researcher 
R   
Project Coordinator  S 
10 
T  Researcher 
U 
11 
Forestry R&D Coordinator 
V  R&D Director 
X 
Researcher 
Z  12 
AA 
13 
R&D Coordinator 
BB  Researcher 
CC  Manager of Planning and forestry research 
DD 
14 
Coordinator of genetic improvement 
EE  R&D Manager 
FF 
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II  Director of Institutional Relationships 
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OO 
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QQ 
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